Thai Magazine Publishes Provocative Anti-Coup Issue

This seems worthy of mentinon. Chang Noi, an anonymous columnist published in the Thai English daily The Nation wrote in the March 5 issue:

Last month, the magazine Fa Dieo Kan put out a special issue on the coup. The editor apologises upfront for making no pretence of even balance. This publication is unremittingly and furiously against the coup. The contents include articles, speeches, interviews and translations by 20 people, so there is no single argument, and much disagreement. But the book's overall message is daring, revealing and very challenging.

The cover tells it all. The graphic lampoons the generals' protests that it was not really a coup. The title is: "The Coup for Democracy with the King as Head of State." The book's first main point is that you cannot start to understand this coup, or current Thai politics at all, without confronting the role of the monarchical institution. (my emphasis)

In these writers' usage, the monarchical institution is not an individual or family but a much larger collection of people including Privy councillors and royalist supporters. This monarchical institution is like a "black box" in economic or scientific theory. You cannot see inside so you don't know how it works. But you can see what it does and what the effects are on the outside world. Several of the writers argue that the major role of the black box in this coup is undeniable. You need only consider the role of Privy councillors both before and after. These writers then ask why this happened and what are the consequences?

Thongchai Winichakul answers these questions using a long perspective. The history of modern Thailand has tended to be written as good democrats combating bad soldiers. But the crucial battle of that war was fought in 1973, and the war ended by 1992. Instead Thongchai suggests the whole dreary history of coups from 1947 onwards should be seen as an attempt by self-serving elites to control the consequences of what happened in 1932. Their goal is not to return to monarchic rule, but to a form of elite rule that clings to the monarchy for legitimacy. But over time the politicians and the people have become pushier. One counter-strategy of the old elites is to go on and on about corruption and money politics. In itself, this criticism is not bad. But it can easily become a tool to discredit parliamentary politics as a whole, and overthrow the fundamental concept of democracy, the sovereignty of the people. In Thongchai's words, "If a government supported by a popular majority is only a 'jockey', then in the end the government machinery belongs to the king" . . .

This book argues that the big issue now is not the military or political corruption or populism, but how to prevent an elite minority controlling politics and keeping the masses as passive partners, in part by exploiting the symbolic power of the monarchy.

Regular Jotman readers may recall that University of Wisconsin historian Thongchai Winichakul was the author of an earlier statement denouncing the September 19 Thai coup d'etat. It was entitled, "Bad Excuse for a Coup".

Given that in recent months The Nation has behaved as little more than a propaganda arm of the Thai junta, I was pleasantly surprised to discover this Chang Noi column.

“Making Sense” of Thai-Style Democracy

A Jotman reader from Thailand writes in response to a previous JOTMAN.COM posting entitled Beware of Thai-style democracy.

I think you were rather unfair to Pattana Kitiarsa or did not take a look at his paper in full. The paper can be found online here.

The second quote on your post should be attributed to Sulak Sivaraksa, not Pattana. I think Pattana quotes such 'drivel' to make a point on the stance of some of the more conservative Thais. Ditto for the first quote.

Thank you for pointing this out. I have edited the posting to credit Sulak Sivaraksa with the drivel.

The Jotman reader continues:

The point of the paper was not to champion 'Thai Style Democracy.' Rather it was more of an anthropological study of seeking to understand what cultural factors have led some Thais to react to the coup in a positive way.

Pattana is sold on the idea that most Thais supported the coup (“The public overwhelmingly welcomed the military’s move…” he wrote). This view -- prevalent in the Thai media -- is based on tenuous, unreliable evidence (for example: a poll conducted two days after martial law took effect). Also, the paper isn't anthropological in the way that I would have liked it to be: where is the fieldwork? I see no evidence that Pattana had recently been out in the hinterlands of Thailand talking to Thais about their interpretations of the coup. His purported aim is to help us see how Thais make sense of the coup, but methodology would seem to preclude achieving this aim, and his sources stem from the Thai elite -- any number of whom may well enjoy official patronage.

The Jotman reader quotes from Pattana:

I do not mean to defend the coup, but how it is politically and morally justified in Thailand amid the international concerns needs to be understood properly. I argue that the protagonists of Thai-style democracy have built their rationality based on the Thai Buddhist-based cultural paradigms, which emphasize improvisational, compromised, and flexible adjustments to their social world.

"... the protagonists of Thai-style democracy have built their rationality based on Thai-Buddhist cultural paradigms..." Does the good Buddhist construct truth or discover truth? The outstanding problem I had with the paper could be summed up this way: The paper asked how the Thai population “made sense of the coup,” yet managed overlook the cruel absurdity of the question itself.

The following passage points to this absurdity. Pattana Kitiarsa refers to Thongchai Winichakul’s critique – long extracts of which I previously posted on JOTMAN.COM (here and here):

Thongchai Winichakul argues that the 19/9 coup is not a military coup, but a “royalist coup with purposes” including “toppling Thaksin” and creating desirable transitions from the present to the next reign (e.g., a popular choice of heir, a submissive government, and a strong Privy Council). “Thaksin threatened the royalist plan. To royalists, he seemingly sought to adopt for himself the role of kingmaker. The royalist coup consolidates power to General Prem and the royalists, putting their plan on track.” Of course, engaging in this type of interpretation is prohibited by law and almost unthinkable for the protagonists of Thai-style democracy and most, if not all, Thai subjects.

“Engaging in this type of interpretation is… almost unthinkable for… most, if not all, Thai subjects.” Here may lie the key point with respect to making sense of the coup: Wherever entertaining such interpretations is “unthinkable,” truly “making sense” of the coup is impossible (if by “making sense” of something you mean to include an understanding of how and why it happened).

Once -- for whatever reason – you throw out a potentially fruitful line of inquiry (in this case, potential coup instigators and their motives), you throw away hope of “making sense” of something. Restrictions on political speech are fundamentally incompatible with a flourishing democracy.

Pattana writes:

I argue that the protagonists of Thai-style democracy try to make sense of the coup based on (1) their Buddhist-oriented frames of reference ... (2) the cultural construction of power... and (3) the particularly impatient character of the Thai elitist leadership and the public... historically shaped by.. the hero-oriented national historiographies. (my italics)

I think to suggest coup protagonists are helping the people to "make sense of the coup” or seeking to "make sense" of it for themselves is pure euphemism. The apologists for the coup are not concerned with improving peoples understanding of events; they are interested in justifying the coup. This paper is replete with variations of this kind of euphemism.

For the apologist of the coup, myth, legend, and religious morality are means of undermining sense and reason. I might add that underlying this project seems to be an unspoken assumption that the masses are not capable of critical thought. One may detect a self-fulfilling circular kind of logic at work here.

Pattana Kitiarsa wrote: “I do not mean to defend the coup, but how it is politically and morally justified in Thailand amid the international concerns needs to be understood properly." The public effort of the Thai elite to propagate pro-coup propaganda and the private struggle of the average Thai person to "make sense of" events are two different processes. Pattani fails to clearly distinguish between the two. It is not as if such aims are compatible.

The Jotman reader continues:

I don't think there's anything wrong with trying to understand the root of how societies react differently to events, whether it's the Thailand of today or WWII Japan or Nazi Germany. As for the idea of 'Thai Style Democracy' itself, I'm one Thai person who doesn't buy it. But I'm glad that Pattana has written the paper and gave me understanding of the perspective of the other side.

In my opinion, elaborations of cultural uniqueness applied to the political sphere may be positively harmful when they fail to acknowledge the possibility of conflicting class interests; also when they ignore obstacles to the advancement of those interests. Why? Because the appeals to cultural uniqueness – “Thai style democracy” etc. – is part and parcel of the agenda of those groups who stand to gain power (or prestige, money, and status) when universal rights and freedoms are undermined.

The scholar who seeks to interpret and convey the national mythology enters the political dynamic not as a spectator, but as a participant. What kind of participant will the scholar be? Pattana seems to be saying that whereas "radicals" like Thongchai have sought to interpret what actually happened, others “make sense of the coup” on behalf of Thais, for the greater good of Thailand by employing "conventional frames of reference" (i.e. the national mythology). Pattana writes:

Thongchai’s radical interpretation of this coup may or may not be valid, but I think the people, by whom Thongchai and his colleagues were heavily criticized, are not politically naïve or short-sighted. Rather, they are more practical and realistic, focusing on the nation’s integration, security, and spirituality. They have sought for some conventional frames of reference and produced explanations… (my italics)

Pattana apparently views the coup apologists as high-minded folk concerned mainly with the greater good. Yet, the issue at stake today for Thailand is the restoration of durable mechanisms of government. To function as a democracy, Thailand requires first and foremost an informed populace capable of holding rulers accountable. Within a democratic framework, the good ruler is secondary concern -- under a functioning democracy the bad ruler will be fired anyway. With regards to this most urgent need, the fanciful ideas propogated by coup appologists (designed to help Thais "make sense of the coup") deserve to be viewed as part of the problem.

Nevertheless, I agree with the sentiment of the Jotman reader: "I'm glad that Pattana has written the paper and gave me understanding of the perspective of the other side."

A Royalist Coup?

In Bad Excuse for the Coup University of Michigan historian Thongchai Winichakul quoted from an opinion piece he had recently published in a (non-Thai) newspaper:

"Thaksin threatened the royalist plan. To the royalists, he seemingly sought to adopt for himself the role of kingmaker. The royalist coup consolidates power to General Prem and the royalists, putting their plan on track. Will Thailand return to democracy under the guidance of an unelected Privy Council? The constitution that the royalists put in place will reveal the character of government and parliamentary system they have in mind. The anti-Thaksin coup is ultimately the re-assertion of the royalist rule for the transition."

This is perhaps the more important reason for a coup despite signs of weakening "Thaksin regime" before the coup. The coup is not as much about toppling Thaksin as for "Premocracy".

So who exactly is General Prem?
Today he serves as president of the Privy Council. And he was prime minister of Thailand on-and-off from 1980 until 1988. Here is some info about the Thai Privy Council -- the Thai king's "inner circle." Under the "General Prem" topic in Wikipedia it is written: "Some analysts believe that Prem is still one of the most important people in Thai politics due to his influence with the king, and that he was involved in the September 2006 military coup against his political opponent Thaksin Shinawatra. General Prem has a website. Colum Murphy wrote about General Prem's relationship with Thaksin in the September issue of the Far East Economic Review:

Mr. Thaksin’s speech on June 29, in which he accused a “charismatic, extra-constitutional figure” of interfering with the country’s democratic process, has only made matters worse. Later, when pressed by reporters, Mr. Thaksin refused to elaborate on his provocative remarks. Most analysts agree that he was referring to the president of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, himself a former prime minister and former commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army. Gen. Prem is also the king’s right-hand man.

Murphy says Gen. Prem followed up with a speech to Naval officers:

Subsequently, as reported by the Bangkok Post, the general told a gathering of naval officers that: “Individuals who have no ethics and morals are bad people who are full of greed. They may want to live comfortably with a lot of money. But if they have acquired wealth through illegal or unethical means, they no longer deserve to be in this country.” Again, while no names were mentioned, there was little doubt among commentators that the general was referring to Mr. Thaksin.

From the Wikipedia article on King Bhumibol

On 14 July 2006, Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda addresed graduating cadets of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, telling them that the Thai military must serve the King - not the government.

Later in the Summer, Gen. Prem spoke to air force officers. Blogger Andrew Walker posted this clipping from a Bangkok Post story of September 1, 2006 entitled “Prem: Disasters will befall the ill-intentioned":

"Disasters always befall people with ill intentions of exploiting the nation for their own benefit," Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda said yesterday. He made the remarks to conclude a 40-minute lecture at the Air Force Academy attended by a 640-strong audience including senior air force officers. "The nation is sacred. People who think about using it for personal benefit or group benefits will be met with misfortune," said the elder statesman. "Phra Sayam Thewathirat (the nation’s guardian spirit) always protects good people and condemns bad people to a life of suffering," Gen Prem said.

Finally, bringing us up to date on Gen. Prem's activities, the previously mentioned Wikipedia article noted:

The King's role in the coup was the subject of much speculation... The King had an audience with Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanonda at the same time the first Special Forces troops were ordered mobilized.

"But the constitution was still there..."

Here are some more excerpt from Thongchai Winichakul's statement Bad excuse for the coup -- a point-by-point rebuttal of four justifications for the coup.

His election victories were valid. No significant irregularity that would change the results of his two landslide victories. Academics, including myself, can argue against his populist policies, his horrible handling of the crisis in the Malay Muslim region, and so on. But Thai people elected his party and the “Thaksin regime.”

In the next paragraph he forcefully articulates some bedrock democratic principles as he sees them applying to the situation in Thailand:

Democracy anywhere in the world is never a rule of the educated, the smarter, the urban, or the better-informed. It is a rule by popular mandate. No matter if/ how ignorant people are, the elected government has the rights to rule. It is true that democracy does not mean only election. But election is THE ultimate and inviolable source of legitimacy to rule. The higher moral or good ethics is not. The higher education is not. The better access to information is not. Nor are weapons or any unelected aristocrats. Democracy is never without corruption and abuses of power.

He says the real and perceived offenses of the Thaksin against democracy are nothing compared to the coup, because the coup was against the constitution, the very foundation of a democratic society:

...democracy grows as the results of the unwavering struggles within the bound of constitution and rule of law. This is the ONLY SOLUTION to establish a strong democracy.... This excuse is shamelessly an elitist arrogance and prejudice that denies the rights of people who elected Thaksin as worthless and negligible. They are the majority of people but whose voices do not count. This excuse is utterly anti-democratic....

It (the constitution) was violated, ignored, and tampered with; probably similar to what Bush was doing now. But the constitution was still there to provide opportunities to fight the abusive regime. In fact many fights were successful and more were waging, thanks to the constitution....

Responding to the often heard claim that Thaksin's abuse of the media justified a coup d'etat, Thongchai Winichakul wrote:

But it was never able to control or manipulated to such extent that differing views were shut down. Critics were frustrated for being shut up but they were never being shut down. Anti-Thaksin publications were among the best selling titles.... Thaksin the Evil was not able to close our eyes, ears and mouths. The struggles against the interferences had been going on and could go on. The coup is not necessary. Who would dare to say that media freedom and freedom of expression with no fear is better under a coup regime?

Winichakul concludes by asking:

Does Bush deserve a military coup or some drastic measures to get rid of him as a necessary evil and the only solution to rescue the world? Now you may understand how those “terrorists” think as well.

There is NO excuse for the coup.

Bad excuse for the coup

"The more successful is the monarchy’s role in modern democracy, the harder it is to be replicated. Things must be put in order before the next reign begins. Thailand is indeed at a critical and delicate juncture."

So writes Thongchai Winichakul at the University of Wisconsin. This thought, which relates directly to a point which I made in the previous post, is taken from a longer statement he has recently published online Bad excuse for the coup which is a point-by-point rebutal of four justifications for the coup. Thanks go to Bangkok Pundit and Andrew Walker at New Mandala.