Crimes Against Humanity: When the Fates of Vietnamese Boat Refugees were in Thai Hands

I recently read Jon Swain's River of Time. It is a fantastic account of the war correspondent's adventures in Indochina focusing on the Vietnam war and the rise of the Khmer Rouge. One of the saddest chapters in the whole book was his account of the rape, robbery, and murder of Vietnamese refugees by Thai fishermen during the late 1980s.

In a recent posting, Bangkok Pundit reports that Thai government ministers may have been culpable in those deaths.

Some background from the Pundit's report: this week, former Thai senator Kraisak called for Thailand to ratify the International Criminal Court so charges of "crimes against humanity" might be brought against deposed PM Thaksin in relation to his prosecution of the war on drugs (alleged to have involved summary executions of suspected drug criminals by the police).

Bangkok Pundit asks: "I wonder what Kraisak thinks about Prem's government from 1980-1988, given his Dad was a Deputy Prime Minister at the time and he was Daddy's adviser for a period. Let's have a look at one thing that happened when Prem was PM." Bangkok Pundit has posted exerpts from an article detailing the horendous humanitarian consequences of directives issued by the Thai government of the day.

Many observers of Thailand say General Prem was a principle figure behind the recent coup. Back when General Prem was prime minister, his government's policies towards the Vientnamese boat people represented a low point in the history of modern Thailand. The leaders of the day should be held to account for their decisions.

“Making Sense” of Thai-Style Democracy

A Jotman reader from Thailand writes in response to a previous JOTMAN.COM posting entitled Beware of Thai-style democracy.

I think you were rather unfair to Pattana Kitiarsa or did not take a look at his paper in full. The paper can be found online here.

The second quote on your post should be attributed to Sulak Sivaraksa, not Pattana. I think Pattana quotes such 'drivel' to make a point on the stance of some of the more conservative Thais. Ditto for the first quote.

Thank you for pointing this out. I have edited the posting to credit Sulak Sivaraksa with the drivel.

The Jotman reader continues:

The point of the paper was not to champion 'Thai Style Democracy.' Rather it was more of an anthropological study of seeking to understand what cultural factors have led some Thais to react to the coup in a positive way.

Pattana is sold on the idea that most Thais supported the coup (“The public overwhelmingly welcomed the military’s move…” he wrote). This view -- prevalent in the Thai media -- is based on tenuous, unreliable evidence (for example: a poll conducted two days after martial law took effect). Also, the paper isn't anthropological in the way that I would have liked it to be: where is the fieldwork? I see no evidence that Pattana had recently been out in the hinterlands of Thailand talking to Thais about their interpretations of the coup. His purported aim is to help us see how Thais make sense of the coup, but methodology would seem to preclude achieving this aim, and his sources stem from the Thai elite -- any number of whom may well enjoy official patronage.

The Jotman reader quotes from Pattana:

I do not mean to defend the coup, but how it is politically and morally justified in Thailand amid the international concerns needs to be understood properly. I argue that the protagonists of Thai-style democracy have built their rationality based on the Thai Buddhist-based cultural paradigms, which emphasize improvisational, compromised, and flexible adjustments to their social world.

"... the protagonists of Thai-style democracy have built their rationality based on Thai-Buddhist cultural paradigms..." Does the good Buddhist construct truth or discover truth? The outstanding problem I had with the paper could be summed up this way: The paper asked how the Thai population “made sense of the coup,” yet managed overlook the cruel absurdity of the question itself.

The following passage points to this absurdity. Pattana Kitiarsa refers to Thongchai Winichakul’s critique – long extracts of which I previously posted on JOTMAN.COM (here and here):

Thongchai Winichakul argues that the 19/9 coup is not a military coup, but a “royalist coup with purposes” including “toppling Thaksin” and creating desirable transitions from the present to the next reign (e.g., a popular choice of heir, a submissive government, and a strong Privy Council). “Thaksin threatened the royalist plan. To royalists, he seemingly sought to adopt for himself the role of kingmaker. The royalist coup consolidates power to General Prem and the royalists, putting their plan on track.” Of course, engaging in this type of interpretation is prohibited by law and almost unthinkable for the protagonists of Thai-style democracy and most, if not all, Thai subjects.

“Engaging in this type of interpretation is… almost unthinkable for… most, if not all, Thai subjects.” Here may lie the key point with respect to making sense of the coup: Wherever entertaining such interpretations is “unthinkable,” truly “making sense” of the coup is impossible (if by “making sense” of something you mean to include an understanding of how and why it happened).

Once -- for whatever reason – you throw out a potentially fruitful line of inquiry (in this case, potential coup instigators and their motives), you throw away hope of “making sense” of something. Restrictions on political speech are fundamentally incompatible with a flourishing democracy.

Pattana writes:

I argue that the protagonists of Thai-style democracy try to make sense of the coup based on (1) their Buddhist-oriented frames of reference ... (2) the cultural construction of power... and (3) the particularly impatient character of the Thai elitist leadership and the public... historically shaped by.. the hero-oriented national historiographies. (my italics)

I think to suggest coup protagonists are helping the people to "make sense of the coup” or seeking to "make sense" of it for themselves is pure euphemism. The apologists for the coup are not concerned with improving peoples understanding of events; they are interested in justifying the coup. This paper is replete with variations of this kind of euphemism.

For the apologist of the coup, myth, legend, and religious morality are means of undermining sense and reason. I might add that underlying this project seems to be an unspoken assumption that the masses are not capable of critical thought. One may detect a self-fulfilling circular kind of logic at work here.

Pattana Kitiarsa wrote: “I do not mean to defend the coup, but how it is politically and morally justified in Thailand amid the international concerns needs to be understood properly." The public effort of the Thai elite to propagate pro-coup propaganda and the private struggle of the average Thai person to "make sense of" events are two different processes. Pattani fails to clearly distinguish between the two. It is not as if such aims are compatible.

The Jotman reader continues:

I don't think there's anything wrong with trying to understand the root of how societies react differently to events, whether it's the Thailand of today or WWII Japan or Nazi Germany. As for the idea of 'Thai Style Democracy' itself, I'm one Thai person who doesn't buy it. But I'm glad that Pattana has written the paper and gave me understanding of the perspective of the other side.

In my opinion, elaborations of cultural uniqueness applied to the political sphere may be positively harmful when they fail to acknowledge the possibility of conflicting class interests; also when they ignore obstacles to the advancement of those interests. Why? Because the appeals to cultural uniqueness – “Thai style democracy” etc. – is part and parcel of the agenda of those groups who stand to gain power (or prestige, money, and status) when universal rights and freedoms are undermined.

The scholar who seeks to interpret and convey the national mythology enters the political dynamic not as a spectator, but as a participant. What kind of participant will the scholar be? Pattana seems to be saying that whereas "radicals" like Thongchai have sought to interpret what actually happened, others “make sense of the coup” on behalf of Thais, for the greater good of Thailand by employing "conventional frames of reference" (i.e. the national mythology). Pattana writes:

Thongchai’s radical interpretation of this coup may or may not be valid, but I think the people, by whom Thongchai and his colleagues were heavily criticized, are not politically naïve or short-sighted. Rather, they are more practical and realistic, focusing on the nation’s integration, security, and spirituality. They have sought for some conventional frames of reference and produced explanations… (my italics)

Pattana apparently views the coup apologists as high-minded folk concerned mainly with the greater good. Yet, the issue at stake today for Thailand is the restoration of durable mechanisms of government. To function as a democracy, Thailand requires first and foremost an informed populace capable of holding rulers accountable. Within a democratic framework, the good ruler is secondary concern -- under a functioning democracy the bad ruler will be fired anyway. With regards to this most urgent need, the fanciful ideas propogated by coup appologists (designed to help Thais "make sense of the coup") deserve to be viewed as part of the problem.

Nevertheless, I agree with the sentiment of the Jotman reader: "I'm glad that Pattana has written the paper and gave me understanding of the perspective of the other side."

Banned Handley Biography of King Bhumibol, "The King Never Smiles," Flying off the Shelves in Singapore

SINGAPORE - A Singapore doctor I saw yesterday wouldn't stop talking about the Thai coup d'etat. The residents of the city state are taking interest in the political situation in Thailand.

A huge stack of the new King Bhumibol biography greets entrants to Singapore's largest bookstore. I watched as several customers perused copies of the The King Never Smiles.

Paul M. Handley's account of the king's life is an absorbing one to anyone who has taken an interest in the country's affairs, because the life of the world's longest-serving monarch is very much the story of modern Thailand. Handley, who reported for the Far East Economic Review from Bangkok during the 1990s, describes how the Thai monarch has had an impact on so many areas of Thai life -- transportation infrastructure, environmental protection, charities for the poor, punishment of criminals offenders, relations with Myanmar and Cambodia, and the military. And in Handley's view, the royal intrusion into these spheres has not necessarily been for the better (to put it mildly).

In the last chapter (written before the coup) Handley expresses concern that the two central figures in Thai politics, King Bhumibol and General Prem, are in their eighties. Handley speculates that in a worst case scenario -- when Thailand finds itself without either illustrious elder, the question of succession could even lead to civil war.

"Difficult times ahead for Thailand" would be an apt subtitle for this most timely book.

UPDATE: I just added this post, which covers a recent review of Handley's book.

A Royalist Coup?

In Bad Excuse for the Coup University of Michigan historian Thongchai Winichakul quoted from an opinion piece he had recently published in a (non-Thai) newspaper:

"Thaksin threatened the royalist plan. To the royalists, he seemingly sought to adopt for himself the role of kingmaker. The royalist coup consolidates power to General Prem and the royalists, putting their plan on track. Will Thailand return to democracy under the guidance of an unelected Privy Council? The constitution that the royalists put in place will reveal the character of government and parliamentary system they have in mind. The anti-Thaksin coup is ultimately the re-assertion of the royalist rule for the transition."

This is perhaps the more important reason for a coup despite signs of weakening "Thaksin regime" before the coup. The coup is not as much about toppling Thaksin as for "Premocracy".

So who exactly is General Prem?
Today he serves as president of the Privy Council. And he was prime minister of Thailand on-and-off from 1980 until 1988. Here is some info about the Thai Privy Council -- the Thai king's "inner circle." Under the "General Prem" topic in Wikipedia it is written: "Some analysts believe that Prem is still one of the most important people in Thai politics due to his influence with the king, and that he was involved in the September 2006 military coup against his political opponent Thaksin Shinawatra. General Prem has a website. Colum Murphy wrote about General Prem's relationship with Thaksin in the September issue of the Far East Economic Review:

Mr. Thaksin’s speech on June 29, in which he accused a “charismatic, extra-constitutional figure” of interfering with the country’s democratic process, has only made matters worse. Later, when pressed by reporters, Mr. Thaksin refused to elaborate on his provocative remarks. Most analysts agree that he was referring to the president of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, himself a former prime minister and former commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army. Gen. Prem is also the king’s right-hand man.

Murphy says Gen. Prem followed up with a speech to Naval officers:

Subsequently, as reported by the Bangkok Post, the general told a gathering of naval officers that: “Individuals who have no ethics and morals are bad people who are full of greed. They may want to live comfortably with a lot of money. But if they have acquired wealth through illegal or unethical means, they no longer deserve to be in this country.” Again, while no names were mentioned, there was little doubt among commentators that the general was referring to Mr. Thaksin.

From the Wikipedia article on King Bhumibol

On 14 July 2006, Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda addresed graduating cadets of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, telling them that the Thai military must serve the King - not the government.

Later in the Summer, Gen. Prem spoke to air force officers. Blogger Andrew Walker posted this clipping from a Bangkok Post story of September 1, 2006 entitled “Prem: Disasters will befall the ill-intentioned":

"Disasters always befall people with ill intentions of exploiting the nation for their own benefit," Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda said yesterday. He made the remarks to conclude a 40-minute lecture at the Air Force Academy attended by a 640-strong audience including senior air force officers. "The nation is sacred. People who think about using it for personal benefit or group benefits will be met with misfortune," said the elder statesman. "Phra Sayam Thewathirat (the nation’s guardian spirit) always protects good people and condemns bad people to a life of suffering," Gen Prem said.

Finally, bringing us up to date on Gen. Prem's activities, the previously mentioned Wikipedia article noted:

The King's role in the coup was the subject of much speculation... The King had an audience with Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanonda at the same time the first Special Forces troops were ordered mobilized.